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SUMMARY:  Dionysus’ unexpected decision at the end of the play is generally thought 
to reflect the notion that poets such as Aeschylus and Euripides had practical moral 
insight to offer their audiences and to promote an “Aeschylean” over a “Euripidean” 
approach to life. I argue, however, that this ending offers a curiously offbeat combination 
of aesthetic insight and intertextual playfulness that ultimately relieves the Aristophanic 
Aeschylus and Euripides of the moralizing burden they have had to shoulder for so long. 
My reasons for suggesting this arise from consideration of the relationship between Frogs 
and another literary text that featured a high-profile poetic contest, namely, the Contest of 
Homer and Hesiod.
Of all the questions raised by aristophanes’ frogs, one of the most enduring—and one 
with broad interpretative ramifications—is why Dionysus decides at the end of the play 
that he should return to Athens with Aeschylus rather than Euripides. As he famously 
declared at the opening of the play, after all, he had worked up a strong “longing” (53 
p“yow) for Euripides while reading his Andromeda on board ship (52–54), and had 
determined to retrieve that poet from the underworld, not Aeschylus. The plot from that 
point on is well known: when he arrives in the underworld, Dionysus encounters both 
Aeschylus and Euripides, discovers that there is a controversy even in Hades about which 
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is the better poet, and ends up adjudicating an extended contest of poetic skill between 
the two. Dionysus’ putative criterion for determining each poet’s respective value 
eventually shifts from one of simple pleasure to how each might save a war-weary and 
politically unstable Athens. When the choice is framed in this way, Dionysus feels he 
must choose Aeschylus instead of Euripides.1
Whether or not the end of the play reflects Dionysus’ growth from something of an 
irresponsible hedonist to a more mature polis-minded cultural critic (thereby implying 
Aristophanes’ endorsement of Aeschylus over Euripides), as has been argued by many 
recent scholars,2 all would agree that the outcome of the contest exposes a complex 
contemporary debate about the relationship between poets and their audiences. By the 
end of the play, the audience must assimilate not only Dionysus’ unexpected decision but 
also its larger significance within the context of this debate. Through it all, a simple 
question persists: did Aristophanes really just want us to think that Aeschylus was a 
“better” poet than Euripides—more beneficial to the polis in its current precarious 
situation, better at providing moral edification for his audience—and that Euripides 
composed socially dangerous, even immoral, drama? 
While there may not be a complete consensus on this question, most critics assume 
that Aristophanes himself took seriously the notion that poets such as Aeschylus and 
Euripides had practical moral insight to offer their audiences, and that the end of Frogs 
actively promoted an “Aeschylean” over a “Euripidean” approach to life.3 Dionysus’ 
unexpected decision at the end of the play is routinely seen as the culmination of such a 
moral trajectory. I will be arguing in this study, however, that the ending of Frogs is 
considerably more subtle than is generally allowed, and that it offers a curiously offbeat 
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combination of aesthetic insight and intertextual playfulness that ultimately relieves the 
Aristophanic Aeschylus and Euripides of the moral burdens they have been forced to bear 
for so long. My reasons for suggesting this arise from considering the relationship 
between Frogs and another literary text that featured a high-profile poetic contest, 
namely, the Contest of Homer and Hesiod (Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi).4 That the 
Certamen, or, more precisely, a work very similar to the extant Certamen,5 might have 
served as a model for the agôn in Frogs has been casually proposed over the years, but 
the ramifications of such a connection for an interpretation of the play itself have never 
been adequately explored. As I shall argue here, the evidence suggests that the influence 
of the Certamen on Frogs was considerably more profound and far-reaching than has 
previously been thought, and is potentially capable of altering our reading of the 
comedy’s famous ending. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
In 1944 Franz Dornseiff, reviewing Schadewaldt’s 1942 German translation of 
Wilamowitz’s edition of the Homeric and Hesiodic Vitae, registered surprise that 
practically no one had considered a connection between the Certamen and the agôn in 
Frogs. As he noted, except for Ludwig Radermacher, who had taken brief note of such a 
connection in his 1921 commentary on Frogs, no one had fully realized the striking 
structural and thematic resemblances between the two works.6 Dornseiff proceeded as far 
as he could with the topic within the scope of a book review, but his discussion does not 
seem to have made much of an impression at the time. Konrad Heldmann, in his 1982 
monograph on the Certamen, built on Dornseiff’s observations and discussed further 
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structural parallels between the two works as agônes sophias, but the focus of his project 
did not allow him to dilate on Frogs.7 Moreover, although Heldmann does hypothesize an 
early certamen-tradition (what he calls an Urcertamen) that might have been known to 
Aristophanes, he felt that many of the details of the extant Certamen were variations or 
revisions of a later date; thus his own notion of how the Certamen evolved limited what 
he could say about its relationship to Frogs. Neil O’Sullivan too flagged a relationship 
between the Certamen and Frogs in his 1992 study, Alcidamas, Aristophanes and the 
Beginnings of Greek Stylistic Theory, but it was beyond his focus there to address this 
topic at any length.8
Despite at least a passing interest among Certamen scholars in the notion that the 
treatise in some form or another may have had some influence on Frogs, their work has 
not had much impact within the mainstream of critical commentary on Frogs.9 It deserves 
a much more thorough treatment than it has yet received, one that focuses particularly on 
how a putative connection with the Certamen (or a certamen-tradition) might be useful as 
an interpretive guide to the Aristophanic agôn, and thus to the significance of Dionysus’ 
decision and Aeschylus’ victory.10 
One reason why a connection between Frogs and the Certamen took so long to be 
recognized is surely the chronological problem. Since the Certamen as we have it is 
evidently a composition of the 2nd century A.D. (confirmed by a reference to the emperor 
Hadrian at the beginning, l. 33),11 it obviously could not have influenced Aristophanes. 
Many scholars have long suspected, however, that the extant version reflects a tradition 
of much greater antiquity. Friedrich Nietzsche, in a pair of foundational articles from 
1870 and 1873, proposed an early history of the Certamen, arguing that the treatise as we 
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have it derived ultimately from Alcidamas’ Mouseion, written in the fourth century B.C.12 
In subsequent decades two papyri were discovered that, it is now generally agreed, 
corroborate his suggestion. As O’Sullivan has put it, the evidence is “most easily 
explained by the assumption that Alcidamas, in his Mouseion, wrote a version of the 
Certamen essentially the same as the extant one, and that the papyri are part of this 
version.”13 
As a figure of the fourth century, Alcidamas is also too late to have influenced Frogs,
so one would like to know whether the sophist was himself incorporating a still earlier 
certamen-tradition into his own work. The case for such a pre-Alcidamantine tradition 
has been argued persuasively by others,14 and we need not rehearse all the arguments 
here, but a few general points will serve to orient our subsequent discussion. As is often 
pointed out, the Certamen’s organizing principle of the agôn sophias has numerous early 
parallels in Greek culture and is clearly traditional. Often such contests involved the kind 
of riddling competition between sophoi that we find in the Certamen.15 It is indeed 
difficult to imagine that Alcidamas would have had to invent the story of a contest 
between Homer and Hesiod when the two poets had assumed the roles of eminent sophoi 
long before.16 O’Sullivan has discussed at length the evidence that Homer and Hesiod 
were viewed in the fifth century as representatives of rival literary styles and competing 
world-views—and these were precisely the sort of topics that Alcidamas would have 
been interested in highlighting in his own version of the Certamen.17 It seems more likely 
that a Certamen would have arisen early as a treatise emblematic of such a rivalry than 
that Alcidamas would have had to concoct it himself. Finally, it is worth mentioning that 
we find in a passage from Aristophanes’ Peace (421 B.C.), lines 1282–83, two verses 
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from one of the riddle passages in the extant Certamen (107–8). It is hard to know what 
to make of such a short quotation, but it does seem easier to suppose that Aristophanes 
was quoting a pre-existing text of the Certamen than that Alcidamas appropriated the 
lines from Aristophanes for a newly composed certamen-story in his Mouseion.18 
Even if it is impossible to pinpoint early versions of Certamen, the kernel of the story 
seems readily discernible in Hesiod’s Works and Days (650–62), where the poet alludes 
to his participation at Chalcis in a poetic competition at the funeral games for king 
Amphidamas.19 Hesiod won the prize at this festival, and although the rival whom he 
bested is not mentioned by name, the language of the entire passage has been seen to 
suggest that he regarded his victory there as a victory of his poetic style over that of 
Homeric epos.20 The available evidence, in short, does seem to indicate that some 
tradition of a formal contest between the two epic poets pre-dated the production of 
Frogs at the end of the fifth century. 
A brief summary of the extant Certamen will be useful here as a reference point for 
the argument that follows. This short work (338 lines), despite its traditional title, is 
actually a truncated vita of both poets; that is, it opens with a discussion of their 
respective parentage and the problem of chronological priority, spends most of its time on 
the alleged contest between the two at Chalcis, then follows them both to their respective 
deaths. Just under half of the work deals with the contest itself, which culminates in the 
victory of Hesiod over Homer. Homer and Hesiod had come to Chalcis in response to the 
open invitation by Amphidamas’ son, Ganyktor, to celebrate the king’s death with 
athletic and poetic competitions, and they evidently put on quite a show (70–71 
Èmfot
rvn d¢ t´n poiht´n yaumast´w Ègvnisam
nvn “the two poets competed 
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wonderfully”). Hesiod, however, then comes forward and administers a series of tests to 
Homer, first two general questions (to which Homer responds by quoting his own 
verses), then some lines that make no sense by themselves but that Homer must in his 
turn complete with lines that make them sensible. Further questions of both a specific and 
a general nature ensue, with Hesiod once again posing the questions and Homer 
extemporizing successful answers. The Greeks in the audience judged that Homer was 
the winner (176–77). But King Panedes was not ready to end the contest, and asked each 
of them to recite what he considered his best passage. Again the audience was amazed at 
Homer (205–6 yaum„santew … tn ‹Omhron o  ‹Ellhnew ßp noun), and demanded 
that he take the prize. The text continues, however (207–10), 
 ! d¢ basile¡w tn —Hs§odon ßstef„nvsen e p n d§kaion eânai tn ßpã 
gevrg§an kaã e r*nhn prokalo+menon nikÁn, o» tn pol
mouw kaã 
sfagÂw dieji“nta.
But the king crowned Hesiod instead, saying that it was right for the one who 
encouraged farming and peace to win, rather than the one who recounted wars and 
slaughters. 
So much for the will of the people! 
There are many curiosities about this work that we cannot address here, but it should 
be apparent by now why earlier scholars suspected a connection between the Certamen 
and Frogs. As classic agônes sophias both works follow a structure in which two 
prominent sophoi are subjected to tests of self-quotation and riddling, with a third 
individual serving as judge.21 Just as Homer and Hesiod vie for superiority in the 
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Certamen in front of King Panedes, so Aeschylus and Euripides compete in Frogs in the 
presence of Dionysus. Moreover, the last incident of the contest proper in the Certamen,
where Panedes demands one further test of the contestants’ verses, is undeniably similar 
to the final scene in Frogs, where Dionysus postpones his decision until he hears what 
each poet has to say about Alcibiades. Connections such as these, as others have noticed, 
seem close enough to suggest that Aristophanes modeled his agôn in Frogs on a text 
resembling the extant Certamen, but what the significance of such a literary affiliation is 
has been less adequately addressed. The question that will concern us here, therefore, is 
whether the portrait of Homer and Hesiod in the Certamen had any specific influence on 
how and why Aristophanes represented Aeschylus and Euripides as he did in his own 
work. Answering this question is, of course, complicated not only by the fact that our 
only text of the Certamen post-dates Frogs but also by the need to determine first what 
the contest of Homer and Hesiod might have meant for its putatively “original” author, 
Alcidamas, and second what cultural valence the story might have had in its earlier, fifth-
century incarnations. 
O’Sullivan has a made strong case that Alcidamas included his version of the 
Certamen in his work not just because it contrasted the extemporaneous, oral style 
embodied by a Homer—a style that Alcidamas himself embraced—with the more rigid, 
written style of a Hesiod, but also because it reflected a nexus of other oppositional 
rhetorical strategies in which he would have had an interest, such as braxulog§a and 
makrolog§a, or notions of kair“w. Moreover, O’Sullivan has shown that framing such 
polarities in terms of an opposition between Homer and Hesiod was almost certainly not 
Alcidamas’ own invention but rather the legacy of the fifth-century sophists who had 
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already begun to exploit the two poets for their own literary, educational, and rhetorical 
polemics.22 One may conclude, therefore, that the specific poetic, ethical, and even 
metaphysical, associations of Homer and Hesiod that undergird the Certamen would have 
been available to Aristophanes, and, even more significantly, that he could have 
understood them as elements in a literary debate of the sort he dramatized in Frogs.
II. THE CERTAMEN AND FROGS 
With this background in mind, we may return to our initial question about Dionysus’ 
change of heart in Frogs. Why did he choose Aeschylus, when we expected Euripides? 
One simple, if rather unilluminating, answer now might be that there was a similarly 
unexpected change at the end of the Certamen, brought about, likewise, by the judge of 
the contest. Despite Homer’s brilliant performance throughout the contest, and the 
universal approval of the audience, Panedes imperiously contravenes public sentiment at 
the last minute and awards the victory to Hesiod, offering an excuse that, within the 
context of the story itself, seems as contrived and tendentious as anything we find in the 
agôn between the two tragedians in Frogs. Indeed the Certamen gives such mixed 
messages throughout: it begins with Hesiod in complete control of the proceedings, 
implying that the narrative “favors” him, but as Homer answers all challenges with flair 
and modesty, Hesiod grows irritable and the balance shifts towards Homer; twice the 
narrator tells us that the people acclaimed Homer the winner, but Panedes holds out. 
Panedes’ excuse elicits no commentary from the narrator, as if he too was persuaded that 
the poet of peace must be superior to the poet of war. But the matter does not rest there, 
for in the concluding section about the poets’ deaths, as Lefkowitz notes, we are left with 
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the “impression that Hesiod is the lesser of the two poets because he gives 
proportionately more space to Homer,”23 and as O’Sullivan expands, “… Hesiod is 
dispatched so quickly that he writes no more poetry … and his death was a sordid one in 
the version that the Certamen tells us was in Alcidamas’ Mouseion” (he is murdered and 
thrown into the sea).24 O’Sullivan sensed Alcidamas’ dilemma: he wanted Homer to be 
the hero of his Certamen, but the story of the contest itself, which must have originated in 
the Works and Days passage mentioned earlier, demanded that Hesiod be the victor. 
Alcidamas, therefore, could not avoid the fact of a Hesiodic victory, but he could at least 
make every attempt to downplay the significance or merit of Hesiod’s victory.25 
The close relationship I am suggesting between the Certamen and Frogs implies, of 
course, the existence of a Panedes-figure in a pre-Alcidamantine Certamen. The origin of 
Panedes and his role in the treatise have been matters of some dispute among scholars, 
but a third-century B.C. papyrus has convinced most that Panedes appeared reasonably 
early and made an appearance in Alcidamas’ version.26 It is a more complex matter to 
argue that Panedes, or at least a figure playing the role of a capricious judge, appeared 
even earlier than that, in fifth-century versions of the Certamen, since this elicits the 
larger question of what significance the Certamen would have had for Greek audiences 
before Alcidamas. Would they, for example, have found a Hesiodic victory over Homer 
unproblematic? If not, there would have been no need for a Panedes-figure to appear to 
repudiate a popular sentiment with a minority decision; Hesiod could simply be 
acclaimed the winner by the people and the judges on the basis of his poetic skill. This is 
always possible, of course, but it seems unlikely, given that the very point of the story of 
the contest depends on the tension between Homer’s profound and enduring cultural 
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capital and the inescapable fact that Hesiod—a poet of high stature, but nothing 
compared to Homer—had to win the contest.27 Rather, the end of the contest is given an 
exciting twist: the victory of Hesiod is so problematic that only the unexpected 
intercession of an outsider such as Panedes, someone evidently out of touch with public 
sentiment about Homer, could account for it. Indeed, without the detail of the judge who 
tenders an unexpected and unwelcome decision, I would venture to say that there would 
effectively be no Certamen. For these reasons, it seems likely that a Panedes-figure was 
known to Aristophanes at the end of the fifth century. 
To return, then, to the question of Dionysus’ decision in Frogs: is Dionysus simply 
playing the role of Panedes? Dionysus’ behavior, of course, does not replicate Panedes’ 
action precisely (Panedes reverses a public decision, while Dionysus reverses an earlier 
one of his own), but it is easy to characterize the Frogs agôn, as Martin West observed of 
the Certamen, as belonging to a type of story “much favored by the Greeks in that a man 
does the opposite of what is expected, and justifies himself with an original and by no 
means contemptible analysis of the situation.”28 I would suggest that Aristophanes, in 
fact, had very much on his mind some form of the Certamen story when he composed the 
agôn of Frogs, and that Dionysus’ change of heart at the end can be at least partially 
explained by this connection. But in itself this explanation does not address the more 
revealing question of why Aristophanes would want to model his contest on a Certamen 
story; that is, what elements of a contest between Homer and Hesiod might have 
resonated with him as he contrived his own contest between Aeschylus and Euripides? 
These are the questions that will occupy us for the rest of this study, in which I will argue 
that the stylistic and poetico-ethical controversies that underlay the Certamen were 
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manipulated in a variety of ways by Aristophanes for his own purposes. Just what his 
“purposes” were at the end of Frogs, of course, has long been a matter of spirited debate, 
both substantively and methodologically, but as I will suggest below, a full understanding 
of the play’s relationship with the Certamen goes far in clarifying many of them. 
While we may never know what inspired the original story of a Certamen, its history 
shows that it was typically invoked in order to contrast the poetic styles of Homer and 
Hesiod. Hesiod, as we have seen, wins the contest, but Homer performs brilliantly, and 
the work itself demonstrates the difficulties inherent in deciding which one is “better.”29 
Likewise, the competition between Aeschylus and Euripides was explicitly cast as a 
contrast of styles, and as an attempt to determine the “better” poet. Frogs is a comedy, of 
course, and neither poet is spared a drubbing, but each is also given moments in the play 
when he is allowed to shine at the expense of the other. Dionysus’ famous aporia at the 
end of the play is sufficient testimony that the choice between their respective styles was 
not straightforward, despite the fact that one of them had to win. 
It seems likely, then, that at the end of Frogs, Dionysus’ verdict and the stylistic 
debate that leads up to it are linked to the Certamen and the stylistic debate that so 
interested Alcidamas.30 It seems, in fact, that in this scene Aristophanes parodies the 
Certamen quite pointedly by assimilating into his own agôn the Certamen’s criteria for 
poetic excellence, along with their stylistic and moral by-products, and then inverting the 
terms of the final decision. We may put it this way: in the Certamen, Homer—clearly the 
favored poet—loses the contest to Hesiod because the judge Panedes preferred, as he 
claims, a poet of peace to a poet of war; in Frogs, Dionysus (despite his professed 
inability to decide) chooses the poet of war, Aeschylus—the one who describes his drama 
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as “full of Ares” (1021) and advocates the recall of Alcibiades. Moreover, as we have 
seen, Aeschylus was the tragedian associated with Homer both stylistically and in terms 
of his interest in martial themes. The Hesiodic poet Euripides, on the other hand, whose 
style was less elevated and whose didactic program included the very Hesiodic topic of 
oikonomikê,31 must lose. In each contest, that is, the favored poet ends up losing the 
contest, but for opposite reasons. The narrative movement in the Certamen goes from 
Homer to Hesiod, while in Frogs it is reversed, from a Hesiodic figure (Euripides) to a 
Homeric one (Aeschylus). 
The remarkably similar structures of the last scenes of each contest further strengthen 
the connection between the two works. From Frogs 1378 to 1406 the two poets engage in 
the famous weighing scene, in which each speaks short selections of his work into a 
scale. At 1407 Aeschylus has had enough: “I’ll have no more line-by-line stuff now!” 
(kaã mhk
t' 3moige kat' 3pow). At this point, the contest is drawing to a close and 
Dionysus is on the verge of deciding the winner, but he laments that he is unwilling to 
alienate either of his “friends” (1411–12 Îndrew f§loi, kÈg  m¢n a»to¡w o» krin´. |
o» gÂr di' 3xyraw o»det
rÉ gen*somai:). “For,” he says at 1413, “the one I find 
sophos, but the other gives me pleasure.” 
(tn m¢n gÂr dgoÀmai sof“n, tì d' •domai). These are, of course, famously 
ambiguous lines that could only be clarified (if ever) by a performed gesture,32 but it is at 
least clear that Dionysus’ allegiances have been thrown into turmoil. However we decide 
to attribute the m
n … d
 clauses, the delay in choosing is surprising and the consequent 
tension effective. As Sommerstein has put it (1996: 283), “Since Aeschylus has had the 
last word in every round of the contest, and has plainly won the weighing test, the 
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audience will certainly have been looking to hear him declared the victor; to their surprise 
Dionysus refuses to make any decision at all, and when as a result of this Plouto breaks 
his long silence … the contest unexpectedly enters a fifth round.” This final round of 
testing requires an answer to the single question: “What do you recommend to save 
Athens from its current troubles?” In contrast to the back and forth of the verse-weighing 
scene, this test allows each poet to state a position on flashpoints of the day, namely, the 
Alcibiades question and current Athenian military strategy. The text of this section has 
been a problem since antiquity, in particular because as transmitted it seems peculiarly to 
allow Euripides to offer a second opinion instead of just the one that was announced for 
each poet (1435–36); what is more, his second opinion seems not unreasonable.33 But for 
our purposes we need only keep in mind that right up to the very end, the eventual winner 
of the contest is not clear. Sommerstein summarizes the situation well (1996: 289): “It is 
… unexpected that in the very last round of the long contest Euripides, the destined loser, 
should be made to offer advice that the audience are presumably expected to judge 
good.” In the roller-coaster ride that the audience’s sympathies have undergone 
throughout the play, we are for a moment at the end faced with the distinct possibility 
that Euripides will be judged the most sensible and effective savior of Athens. The 
critical moment, however, occurs when Aeschylus has the last word, and endorses an 
aggressive buildup of the navy (1463–65), for this seems to be the reason why Dionysus 
finally chooses him. The deliberately delayed decision, the tense, ambiguous final contest 
in which each poet offers cogent advice, and the ultimate decision that certainly goes 
against what the audience had expected at the beginning, and quite possibly against what 
the audience might have expected just before Aeschylus’ final bit of advice—all these 
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elements at the end of Frogs can be readily explained by analogous events in the 
Certamen.
When the first opportunity arises for King Panedes to judge between Homer and 
Hesiod in the Certamen, the two poets have just completed their fourth round34 of 
sparring at lines 161–75, and, like the weighing scene in Frogs, this scene too consists of 
a line-by-line exchange (Hesiod asks a question in one verse, Homer responds in kind). 
At line 176, the narrative unambiguously notes that in the eyes of the audience Homer 
was the clear winner: 
=hy
ntvn d¢ kaã to+tvn, o m¢n ‹Ellhnew p„ntew tn ‹Omhron ßk
leuon stef
anoÀn (“When these things were spoken, all the Hellenes ordered Homer to be 
crowned”). Clearly the king is uneasy about this, and has a prejudice against Homer that 
he needs to pursue, for he delays the decision by asking for a final test. In each work the 
“Homeric” poet (Homer, Aeschylus) is made to win the contest at hand, but the judge 
remains unconvinced, holding on to a predetermined choice: Panedes really wants Hesiod 
to win, Dionysus Euripides. There then follows in the Certamen a final round similar to 
that in Frogs. Homer and Hesiod are both given the chance to recite one passage that they 
regard as their “finest”; in Frogs, as we have seen, each poet is asked to offer his one best 
piece of advice for Athens. As in Frogs, the responses by Homer and Hesiod in the 
Certamen offer no particular help in deciding the winner. Hesiod begins by reciting ten 
lines from Works and Days (383–92); it is a passage of considerable elegance, but it deals 
with the unelevated, domestic topic of agriculture, purporting to offer useful advice on 
ploughing, sowing, and harvesting. We are easily reminded of Euripides’ claims in Frogs 
(e.g., 971–79, quoted n. 30 above) that his own poetry encouraged rational thought and 
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offered practical advice. Homer counters with an amalgam of two passages from Iliad 13
(126–33, 339–44). It is a bristling war passage that reads more as a critique than as an 
exaltation of a military ethos—cf., e.g., 343–44 m„la ken yrasuk„rdiow eáh |
¢w t“te gh  y*seien d n p“non o»d' Èk„xoito “he would be hard–hearted, who 
could enjoy seeing such hardship and not feel pain”—but, as we shall soon see, this is not 
how the king claims to have understood it. 
Once again, the people prefer Homer, finding his verses extraordinary (205–7):  
yaum„santew d¢ kaã ßn to+tÉ tn ‹Omhron o  ‹Ellhnew ßp noun, Öw parÂ
 t pros kon gegon“tvn t´n ßp´n, kaã ßk
leuon did“nai tÿn n§khn. 
At this performance the Greeks were again amazed at Homer and praised him, 
finding his poetry to be well beyond the norm, and they demanded that he be 
given the prize. 
This scene functions analogously to the moment at the end of Frogs (1443–44) when 
Euripides offers the kind of advice, as is often noted, that had already been proposed in 
the play’s parabasis, advice that the “people,” i.e., the audience, would almost certainly 
have endorsed.35 As in Frogs, however, the judge makes an unexpected choice: Panedes 
chooses Hesiod rather than Homer, and his reasons are, on the face of it, about as 
unconvincing as Dionysus’ at the end of Frogs (207–10, quoted in section I above). The 
two contests, therefore, follow parallel lines, although with one revealing discrepancy. 
Insofar as each contest dramatizes a rivalry between poetic styles, it can be said that the 
contests end up with opposite types of winners: in Frogs Aeschylus—with all the 
Homeric baggage that we discussed earlier—is victorious over the “Hesiodic” Euripides, 
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while the Certamen judges Hesiod, and the stylistic associations of Hesiodic poetry, to be 
“better” than Homer and Homeric poetry. 
This discrepancy raises some interesting questions. To begin with the most obvious: 
Why would Aristophanes’ contest end in the opposite manner to its putative model? Is 
this a commentary on the Certamen itself—its social ethos, or its poetic hierarchy, for 
example? Perhaps the simplest reading of the differences between the works might be to 
say that Aristophanes reverses the outcome of the Certamen to show that the times have 
changed so much since that legendary setting that now, in fifth-century Athens, a martial 
poet—a Homer—is exactly what is needed. Dionysus may not be happy about having to 
choose between two poets he admires, but the fact remains that a decision has to be made, 
and he opts for the one who seems most capable of answering Athens’ immediate 
political needs. This is straightforward enough, offering as it does an uncomplicated 
moral reading that more or less accords with traditional interpretations of the ending. The 
Certamen, however, offers a similar resolution to the contest—the poet is chosen who is 
alleged to suit current cultural needs best—but that ending is anything but uncomplicated, 
for the narrative strongly implies that the wrong person was chosen.36 In light of the close 
parallels we have already seen between the Certamen and Frogs, it seems highly likely 
that Aristophanes would have been well attuned to the ramifications of Panedes’ decision 
as he crafted his own final scene of Frogs. If we suppose, then, that Aristophanes 
followed closely the analogue of the Panedes decision in the Certamen, the end of Frogs 
becomes considerably more ironic and un-resolved than most readings—which typically 
see the choice of Aeschylus as teleologically necessary—would allow. 
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To put the crucial question most directly: If Panedes is seen as a bad judge working 
against popular opinion, can the same be said of Dionysus in the Aristophanic contest? In 
the Certamen, as we have seen, there is no question that Homer is the people’s favorite in 
the contest, and that Hesiod himself knew it. Twice Hesiod is described as annoyed at 
Homer’s success. At line 94, Hesiod is “irritated” (ÈxyesyeÄw) at Homer’s fine 
performance, and at line 149, he feels jealousy (fyon´n) of Homer after he had ably 
answered Hesiod’s mathematical questions in 140–45. The assembled Greeks on several 
occasions registered their thauma at Homer (90, 205) and, as we have already noted, 
when Panedes chooses Hesiod instead, at 207, it can only come off as an egregiously 
minority opinion with decidedly autocratic overtones. Does Dionysus likewise ignore 
popular opinion in choosing Aeschylus at the end of Frogs? Or put another way, would 
his initial intention to retrieve Euripides be more in line with what “the people” would 
endorse, if themselves confronted with a choice between him and Aeschylus? This is, of 
course, a difficult question to answer, since it involves an assessment of Euripides’ 
reputation in fifth-century Athens, and such an assessment is irretrievably mediated by 
the complex, but largely fictional, vita-tradition that grew up around him.37 As Lefkowitz 
has well shown, however, despite the malicious or simply absurd stories that eventually 
accreted to his biography, the evidence suggests that at least as early as the fourth century 
Euripides enjoyed virtually heroic status.38 It may be true that Euripides won fewer 
victories in his career than Sophocles, but it is dangerous to extrapolate from this that he 
was unpopular.39 Once we discount the many obvious fictions of the Vitae that turn 
Euripides into an eccentric and embittered character, it becomes clear that he was in fact 
popular and influential in his own time. The simple fact that Euripidean tragedy could be 
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represented, even if comically, as something of a social “problem” in at least two 
Aristophanic plays, testifies to the fact that audiences were drawn to him, and that some 
people, at least, seriously worried about his potentially pernicious moral influence on the 
public.40 Indeed, when Dionysus speaks of his pothos for Euripides at the beginning of 
the play, and the hêdonê he feels for Euripidean poetry at the end, he uses what amounts 
to the vocabulary of a true “fan,” drawn in (to the dismay and disapproval of Aeschylus; 
cf., e.g., 1039–44) by the poet’s treatment of topics that remain irresistibly engaging to 
audiences even today, such as incest, madness, voyeurism, and transvestitism, to name 
only a few. 
Aristophanes, in fact, is quite explicit in characterizing Euripides’ and Aeschylus’ 
respective attitudes toward popularity in Frogs. In the scene beginning at 907, Euripides 
consistently portrays Aeschylus as retiring, dyspeptic, arrogant, self-indulgent, and 
enigmatic. His characters are emblematic of the man and his style, as Euripides notes in 
ridiculing Aeschylus’ Achilles and Niobe (911–13):  
prHtista m¢n gÂr Ana tin' Ìn kayõsen ßgkal+caw, 
…Axill
a tin' µ Ni“bhn, t pr“svpon o»xã deikn+w, 
pr“sxhma t w tragÉd§aw, gr+zontaw o»d¢ tout§. 
 
First he made a single figure sit down, an Achilles or Niobe, say, covered them 
and didn’t even show their face—the mere façade of a tragedy—and they didn’t 
make so much as a grunt. 
Euripides continues by ridiculing the unintelligibility of Aeschylus’ language (930 … 
Ï jumbaleõn o» =Òdi' n). Dionysus too has to agree that he has spent many sleepless 
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nights trying to figure out what a “tawny horsecock” was (931–32). The contrasting 
portrait Euripides paints of himself is well known: he put tragedy on a diet, reduced the 
swollen diction and ambiguity, and had everyone talking, including wives, slaves, girls, 
and old women (948–50). Aeschylus, of course, finds this criminal, but Euripides 
describes his approach as “democratic” (952 dhmokratikn gÂr aŒt' 3drvn), and he 
continues in his famous speech at 959-62 by claiming to have introduced 
o keõa pr„gmata onto the stage: now his audiences understand all his characters’ 
lines, and they can offer reasoned critique of his art if they choose (960–61 
juneid“tew gÂr o!toi | elegxon Ín mou tÿn t
xnhn). In Aeschylus’ response to 
Euripides’ characterization, he confirms that he has no interest in pandering to the masses 
or compromising his dramaturgy for the sake of easy popular acclaim. It is no wonder 
that the arrival of Euripides in the underworld, as described by Plouto’s slave at 771–78, 
created a real uproar: when the reprobates in Hades heard Euripides’ epideixeis of his 
plays, they went crazy over the newcomer and thought he was the cleverest of all: 
OI. òte dÿ kat ly' E»rip§dhw, ßpede§knuto 
toõw lvpod+taiw kaã toõsi ballantiot“moiw 
kaã toõsi patralo§aisi kaã toixvr+xoiw, 
òper 3st' ßn ‹Aidou pl yow, o  d' ÈkroHmenoi 
t´n Èntilogi´n kaã lugism´n kaã strof´n 
Õperem„nhsan kÈn“misan sofHtaton: 
kÍpeit' ßparyeãw Èntel„beto toÀ yr“nou, 
Qn' A sx+low kay sto. 
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When Euripides came down here, he began giving display performances to the 
clothes-snatchers and cutpurses and father-beaters and burglars who abound in 
Hades, and when they heard his argumentative speeches and his twistings and 
weavings, they went quite mad over him and thought he was the greatest; and 
then he got so fired up that he laid claim to the chair where Aeschylus was sitting. 
(tr. Sommerstein). 
It is easily missed that this skirmish in fact furnished the pretext for the contest in the 
play,41 and it is noteworthy that this little vignette both replicates in miniature the 
outcome of the Certamen and presages the outcome of the contest in Frogs. That is, the 
“people” (here the petty criminals mentioned in lines 772-73, who are jocularly said 
[774] to make up the pl yow of Hades) clamor for the one poet,42 but the less popular 
one holds sway at the end of the contest. Indeed, when Xanthias asks ingenuously 
whether Aeschylus had any supporters (782) down in Hades, Plouto’s slave has to admit 
that the “good sort of people,” who would naturally have sided with him, were very few 
(783 Ÿl§gon t xrhst“n ßstin). 
It seems safe to say, therefore, that Euripides in Frogs, like Homer in the Certamen,
is the “people’s favorite,” and the fact that they both lose their respective contests implies 
that the decision was a direct repudiation of the people’s will.43 This notion certainly 
creates some intepretative dilemmas for Frogs, for the end of the play now appears 
considerably more unstable than is usually supposed. A reasonably straightforward 
reading of Dionysus’ “unpopular” decision is to assume that he has himself learned 
during the course of the play that what is “popular” is not necessarily what is morally or 
politically desirable. Sometimes a leader, he might be imagined to say, even in a 
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democracy, must take matters into his own hands and go against popular opinion in the 
interest of the polis. Certainly at this point in Athenian history the military fixation and 
unreflective moral stance of the Aristophanic Aeschylus would be more useful to society 
than the give-and-take of Euripidean intellectualism and discourse, despite the latter’s 
immediate aesthetic allure. On this reading, one might imagine that Aristophanes has 
Dionysus “correct” Panedes’ decision in the Certamen by having him choose the 
“Homeric” figure that Panedes did not, but should have (i.e., if Panedes were to respect 
the will of the audience in the Certamen’s narrative). 
This explanation is attractive prima facie for its simplicity, but does not hold up well 
if we assume that Aristophanes was modeling the Frogs contest on the Certamen with 
some care. If, for example, he intended to replicate the structural and moral details of the 
Certamen with reasonable fidelity, it is likely that Dionysus’ decision also shares in some 
of the negative flavor of Panedes’ decision and that, in a conspicuously intertextual 
move, Aristophanes inverts the Certamen decision (choosing the Homeric Aeschylus, 
while Panedes chooses Hesiod) as a kind of corrective commentary on that text. 
Dionysus, after all, chose the “Homeric” poet (Aeschylus) when he could have chosen 
the Hesiodic one (“Euripides”); Panedes chose Hesiod when he could have chosen 
Homer. In other words, Dionysus chose for himself the poet that Panedes should have 
chosen, but since the figure of Panedes in the Certamen is a negative exemplum of a “bad 
judge,” and since Dionysus adopts the Panedes-role in Frogs, this would seem to imply 
that, in Aristophanes’ eyes, Panedes chose the poet that Dionysus should have chosen 
(i.e., the Hesiodic one—Euripides). Each judge, it seems, chooses wrongly for his own 
narrative, but correctly for the other. 
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III. FROGS AND LITERARY EVALUATION 
If intertextuality of this sort is operative in the final scene of Frogs, the play ends on a 
rather impishly ironic note instead of descending into the sort of tedious moralizing that 
critics have routinely ascribed to it. But if Aristophanes was not particularly interested in 
championing Aeschylus as a “superior” poet to Euripides, neither does he seem 
especially eager to “rehabilitate” Euripides after raking him over the coals, or to 
undermine the victory of Aeschylus. In fact, I rather doubt that he was trying to convey a 
genuine preference for either one in the play. When considered in a strictly literal, 
pedestrian sense, there is little question that Aristophanes makes a reasonable case for 
Aeschylus as the best “savior” of Athens. Aeschylus did deploy larger-than-life heroic 
characters, often in military situations, and Athens was in need of a sound war policy, 
preferably one that was decisive and aggressive. But in view of the play’s relationship 
with the Certamen, it strikes me that Aristophanes was more intrigued by the absurdity of 
supposing that two great but very different poets might be taken out of their artistic 
spheres and imagined as serious political forces than he was moved by any desire to 
influence public policy or inculcate moral values. This seems to be the essential point of 
the Certamen that Aristophanes internalized while composing the Frogs agôn. For 
Panedes’ decision ultimately reveals that in a contest between two great poets, any 
attempt to determine which is “better” according to non-poetic criteria is doomed to be 
capricious. Homer loses that contest because Panedes assesses his verses out of their 
context, applying as a criterion only whether the verses quoted were consonant with the 
values of his own society, and concluding that they were an endorsement of an anti-
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social, military ethos. Panedes makes no attempt to understand the sample in relation to 
the larger work or its immediate setting, no attempt to evaluate poetics as such (e.g., skill 
in diction or meter), and the clash between what the people think and Panedes’ criterion 
only reveals how misdirected his decision was in the eyes of the Certamen’s author, at 
least as an evaluation of poetic skill.44 Both contests claim to be tests of sophia, but that 
term has such a broad semantic range that the decision of each judge cannot help but be 
idiosyncratic. 
The elaborate contest in Frogs drives this point home: Aristophanes does have the 
two tragedians compete over what we might call “poetics” stricto sensu, but this part of 
the contest ends up inconclusively. Neither poet can be said to have “won” those tests, 
and Dionysus simply revels in their different styles, appreciating the good and forgiving 
the bad in each, as his mood dictates, if only as part of the fast-paced comic repartée. 
Rather, his final test of sophia—the question about Alcibiades and Athenian public 
policy—is something quite removed from Aeschylus’ and Euripides’ poetics and 
irrelevant to their respective oeuvres. It performs exactly the same function as Panedes’ 
call for a final comparison between Homer and Hesiod, for implicit in that scene is a 
question similar to the one posed explictly to Aeschylus and Euripides by Dionysus in 
Frogs, i.e., “what can you perform that will do the most good for contemporary society?” 
Whether or not their respective authors were fully conscious of it, in fact, there lies 
behind these scenes a highly nuanced critique of the uses of poetry, and of the criteria 
traditionally used to assess it. In Frogs, despite all the talk of didacticism put into the 
mouths of Aeschylus and Euripides, Aristophanes seems to have understood the near 
futility of articulating exactly what it meant to say that an artistic phenomenon as 
Aristophanes’ Frogs and the Contest of Homer and Hesiod 25
complex as poetry could “teach,” especially, at least, when one starts with the assumption 
that the subject of poetic teaching must be that which is “morally beneficial.” 
There is no warrant, of course, to turn Aristophanes into a systematic literary theorist, 
but at the same time, not far beneath Dionysus’ aesthetic dilemma in Frogs lies a 
monumental problem of literary theory that remains unresolved to this day, namely, 
whether “moral benefit” is a legitimate criterion in the evaluation of poetry. Scholars 
traditionally assume that at the end of Frogs Aristophanes, through the character of 
Dionysus, takes the first rudimentary steps towards formulating an aesthetic theory most 
forcefully set out a few decades later by Plato in the Republic. Like Plato’s famous 
denunciation of “immoral” poetry in his ideal polis (e.g., in Rep. 3.386–98) and his strict 
demand that poetry represent only what is true and good, the victory of Aeschylus in 
Frogs is typically seen to be suffused with self-righteousness.45 Like Dionysus, Plato was 
himself well aware of the seductive, but potentially “amoral,” allure of poetry (Rep.
10.607c6–7), and it is interesting that he has Socrates situate the aesthetic dilemma of 
controversial poetry as part of an “age-old disagreement between philosophy and poetry” 
(607b5 palaiÂ m
n tiw diaforÂ filosof§& te kaã poihtik™). By this he evidently 
refers to a broader tension between what we might call “formalism” and “didacticism” in 
the interpretation of literature, where the criteria for evaluating a poetic work derive 
either from its distinguishing formal elements or from its less tangible “thought” or 
subject matter. Plato was obviously less impressed by a poem’s form, however charming 
it might be, than by its moral character: for him, at least, a poem could have no real 
excellence in the absence of a demonstrable moral benefit to an audience.46 As Plato’s 
allusion to a palaiÂ diafor„ implies, however, he was not the first person to weigh in 
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on this debate, and despite the dominant notion in fifth- and fourth-century Athenian 
culture that poetry should be in some sense didactic, there is every reason to suppose that 
some took an opposing view on the matter. 
Whether or not the Certamen was written originally as a work of literary theory is 
unknowable, but the very idea of a contest between Homer and Hesiod presupposes a 
fundamental theoretical question of literary axiology (“how can one evaluate and rank 
different poets?”), and king Panedes’ decision is an undeniably theory-laden gesture. His 
rationale for the decision—that the subject of Hesiod’s quotation was more desirable for 
society than Homer’s—anticipates Plato’s censorious approach to poetry, and Dionysus 
follows suit at the end of Frogs. But, as we have seen, the conclusion of each contest is 
unsettling because it is shown to run counter to what the audience has been led to expect, 
with the result that each work seems at least to broach the debate over what really 
constitutes “good” poetry; the apparent intertextual relationship between the two works 
brings the debate into even higher relief. 
It is, perhaps, rather alarming to suppose that Aristophanes himself was offering in 
Frogs a critique of an excessively didactic approach to the evaluation of poetry, 
especially since virtually no other representative of this side of that “ancient debate” has 
survived from the fifth century. But there is considerable evidence beginning in the 
Hellenistic period that the problem of literary evaluation was discussed with vigorous 
sophistication, and the complex evolution of the debate may reassure us that it had a 
history reaching at least as far back as the fifth century. The seeds of the debate—whether 
we can distinguish the formal elements and structures of poetry from subject and 
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thought—are visible enough already in Frogs, and the later evidence, for all its 
complexity, can consistently trace an intellectual lineage back to this dichotomy. 
One example from the Hellenistic tradition is worth citing here because of the way in 
which it articulates literary-critical attitudes that I have argued are at play in Frogs and 
the Certamen. While this later evidence obviously cannot be used to prove that such 
attitudes existed in earlier periods, it does make it easier to imagine that they did. In his 
critique of Heraclides of Pontus, Philodemus makes a charge that one could easily 
imagine the Greek audience leveling against Panedes in the Certamen, namely that by 
insisting on the moral benefit of a poet, one runs the risk of repudiating the work of the 
finest poets: 
…di“ti tÂ k„[l- 
li!t[a] po§hmata t´n [do- 
kim[v]t„tvn poiht´[n 
diÂ t mhd… dntinoÀn 
ªfel§an para!keu[„- 
zein, ßn§vn d¢ kaã [tÂ 
pl[eõ]!ta, tin´n d¢ p„[n- 
ta [t] ! Èret ! ßkr[ap]§- 
zei.     (Col. 4 10-18 Mangoni) 
 
…because he expels from excellence the finest poems of the most esteemed poets 
because they don’t offer any benefit; [in the case of] some poets [he expels] most of their 
poems, with others, all of them. 
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The alternative to applying a moral yardstick to poetry was an extreme “formalistic” 
approach, as represented, for example, by Crates of Mallos, for whom “sound” (fvn*)
was the primary criterion of good poetry. But Philodemus argued against this approach as 
well, and held that poetry could in fact benefit or harm an audience. What he seems to 
have objected to, rather, is the idea of applying “moral benefit” as the sole criterion in 
judging whether or not a poet was good.47 One fragment from Book 2 notes that in earlier 
times “Greece” (Hellas) admired as a matter of course poets who portrayed “bad” 
(ponéra) subjects or people. Presumably, his point here is that the criterion for poetic 
assessment involves other things than the moral quality of the characters or actions 
represented in a given work: 
 
…tÿn —El- 
l„da. Èll… ßj… òtou tn48 
…Arx§loxon ßya+maze 
kaã tn —Ippvn„kta 
kaã tn %imvn§dhn, 
kaã t´n par… —Om*rvi  
kaã E»reip§dei kaã toõ! 
Ílloi! poihtaõ! 3nia, 
ponhroõ! pro!Hpoi! 
perike§mena kaã perã 
ponhr´n pragm„tvn 
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gegramm
na...   (P.Herc. 1074 fr. F col. iii 1-12 Sbordone) 
 
…Greece. But ever since [Greece] used to admire Archilochus, Hipponax, Semonides, 
and some things in Homer, Euripides and other poets that are associated with base 
characters and are written about base deeds.  (Tr. Asmis, modified). 
This passage has remarkable relevance for the contests in Frogs and the Certamen, in that 
it articulates the kind of hypothetical response to the controversial decision of each 
contest’s judge which, as I have argued, seems implicit in the very structure of each 
contest. As we have seen, each work highlights conspicuously the very process of 
judging the value of poets, and the potential injustice in store for any poet judged 
according to a strictly moral calculus. We are doubtless meant to imagine that the Greek 
audience in the Certamen (a constituency analogous to Philodemus’ —Ell„! in the 
passage above) was impressed enough by Hesiod’s performance in his contest, and would 
have regarded him as a “good” poet.49 But the work also makes it clear that their criterion 
for poetic excellence (as opposed to Panedes’) was not whether Hesiod’s work offered 
any explicit “benefit” to contemporary society. The implication of their imagined 
response to Panedes is one that would have surely pleased the likes of Philodemus, who 
held that there were plenty of “completely beautiful” (pagk„la) poems “without 
benefit” (Ènvfel ).50 This was Dionysus’ dilemma as well in Frogs, for he clearly 
loved Euripides but was ultimately constrained by what he perceived as a need to judge 
him according to the arbitrary aesthetic criterion of moral benefit.51 There may not be any 
“Greek audience” at the end of the contest in Frogs (as there was at the end of the one in 
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Certamen) to point out to Dionysus that he had abandoned the decidedly non-utilitarian 
criterion for judging good poetry that he announced at the beginning of the play,52 but 
one might well imagine that the crowd who greeted Euripides with wild enthusiasm on 
his arrival in Hades (774-76), would have had a considerable list of objections of their 
own to Dionysus’ decision.  
Frogs is no more a work of literary theory than Clouds is of philosophy, or Wasps of
jurisprudence, yet few would disagree that Aristophanes worked in revealing ways with 
abstract ideas within those fields. The technical vocabulary for discussing the theoretical 
foundation of literary value may have been inchoate in Aristophanes’ time, but the plot of 
Frogs itself and its central theoretical question—of two poets, how does one determine 
which is “better”?—indicate that the basic terms of this aesthetic debate were already 
well established. Because Frogs ends by testing the propaedeutic worth of each 
contestant, and because Aristophanes, like most poets who deploy satire, routinely claims 
(however disingenuously) to instruct his audience, critics have traditionally assumed that 
Dionysus’ choice of Aeschylus ends the play with a didactic flourish.53 But the other side 
of debate was clearly in the air, and just because we have had to wait for Hellenistic 
thinkers to decouple moral benefit from aesthetic merit, does not mean that such 
approaches were unavailable to Aristophanes. The end of Frogs is hardly a solemn and 
systematic theoretical disquisition about poetry, but its intertextual relationship with the 
Certamen, as I have argued above, makes it easy to see that the victory of Aeschylus over 
Euripides raises as many questions about the nature of poetry as it pretends to resolve.54 
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1 For the historical background of Athens at the time of Frogs’ production see Dover 69–
76 and Sommerstein 1996: 1–9. It is often noted (e.g., MacDowell 297) that Dionysus 
claims that his decision to resurrect Aeschylus was still an act of basic hedonism (he 
chooses “the one my soul likes,” 1468), but this is only after each poet answers his final 
political questions and he finds himself scrambling for a decisive criterion. See 
discussion below, section iii, on the significance of Dionysus’ behavior at the end of the 
play. 
2 There are many variants of this approach. See, for example, Bierl 27–44, esp. 41–43, 
Padilla, Bowie 352 (who sees Dionysus’ development as a kind of Eleusinian initiation), 
Sommerstein 1996: 18 (“His experiences can be seen as leading him … to understand and 
internalize the civic significance of dramatic poetry”), and Lada-Richards in her study of 
Dionysus and Dionysian elements in Frogs, which argues (9) for “the various stages of 
Dionysus’ itinerary … as the dramatic re-enactment of the god’s original advent and 
mythical incorporation into the Athenian polis.”
3 Recent discussions include Hubbard 213–19 and von Möllendorff. 
4 Greek citations from the Certamen are taken from vol. 5 of the Oxford Classical Text of 
Homer, ed. T. W. Allen (Oxford 1912). For Frogs, I use Dover’s 1993 edition of the 
play.  
5 On the chronological problems see section <sc>i<sc> below. 
6 Dornseiff 136: “Die beiden Schriften sind sehr ähnlich gebaut, und Aristophanes schützt 
so den überlieferten Text des Agon.” 
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7 Heldmann posited, based on the testimony of Plut. Mor. 153f-154a, an “Urcertamen,”
composed probably some time in the fifth century, that, like Frogs, featured a contest of 
riddles at the end as a means of determining the winner of the agôn. See also Richardson 
1981: 2, who had suggested the year before Heldmann’s monograph appeared that the 
placement of the riddling scene in Frogs might be invoked as an argument in favor of an 
early version of the Certamen along the lines of Plutarch’s account: “… the order of the 
contest in Aristophanes’ Frogs is similar (discussion of prepared passages followed by 
political questioning and riddling answers), and this episode makes better sense if seen 
against the background of an existing story of a contest of Homer and Hesiod.” See 
further n. 25 below. 
8 Cf. O’Sullivan 87 n. 143 and 95 n. 183. As will become clear below, O’Sullivan’s 
discussion of fifth-century literary and rhetorical stylistics provides an important 
backdrop for the argument I pursue in this paper. Lardinois 184 also briefly notes a 
connection between the Certamen and Frogs in his discussion of the Homeric gnômai 
embedded in the Certamen. See also Griffith 189, with n. 19. 
9 Dover and Sommerstein, to name just the most recent commentators, pay no attention to 
the notion. 
10 Cavalli has recently taken the first steps in this direction. Although her treatment of the 
chronological problems inherent in supposing that the Certamen influenced Frogs is 
somewhat cursory, she offers a usefully detailed commentary on the specific points of 
contact between them. In the end, however, Cavalli sees the influence of the Certamen on
Frogs as essentially superficial. She notes a “volontà aristofanea di riprodurre i temi e i 
38 Ralph M. Rosen 
 
moduli espressivi di una sophía antica, che il suo pubblico ben conosceva,” but finds in 
the final scene of Frogs a great gulf between the two works, and suggests that the pains 
Aristophanes takes to establish a relationship with the Certamen really serve only to 
highlight its essential meaninglessness and the Certamen’s “assoluta incompatibilità con 
le esigenze contemporanee più urgenti e reali” of Frogs (105). Cavalli is correct to draw 
attention to the poetico-ethical ambiguity at the end of Frogs, though, as I argue below, 
Aristophanes seems to have found such questions of literary aesthetics well articulated in 
the Certamen. Ford 282 also offers some brief remarks about parallels between the 
Certamen and Frogs.
11 32–34 
òper d¢ Èkhk“amen ßpã toÀ yeiot„tou a»tokr„torow …AdrianoÀ e rhm
non 
Õp t w Puy§aw perã —Om*rou ßkyhs“meya. 
12 Nietzsche’s interest was piqued by the fact that towards the end of the Certamen 
Alcidamas is cited fleetingly as a source for a detail in the story of Hesiod’s death. For a 
discussion of Nietzsche’s approach to the Certamen see now Porter 239–41 and 318 n. 
164. See also Mariss 21–24. 
13 O’Sullivan 64, who summarizes the evidence, with relevant bibliography. O’Sullivan 
reflects a general consensus, though one should be aware that the significance of the 
papyri and the attribution of a Certamen to Alcidamas has been the subject of 
considerable debate since Nietzsche’s day. Cf., e.g., Kirk, West, Koniaris, and Renehan. 
See also Mandilaras for discussion of a more recently discovered papyrus fragment from 
the 1st century <sc>b.c.<sc> that preserves 14 lines of the Certamen.
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14 The clearest exposition can be found in Richardson 1981, who responds to West’s view 
that the story was invented by Alcidamas himself. See also Vogt 219–21 and more 
recently Cavalli 90–92. 
15 See Radermacher 30 and Griffith, esp. 188–92. The myth of Mopsus and Calchas is 
sometimes cited in this regard (it is noteworthy that Hesiod seems to have composed a 
poem on this subject himself; cf. frr. 278–79 Merkelbach-West). Several versions exist, 
but in every case the story ends in Calchas’ death, either because he was unable to answer 
Moschus’ riddles or because Moschus could answer the riddles posed by Calchas and so 
was proven the better seer. Cf. Gantz 702 for the variants and sources. 
16 Heraclitus, among others, provides ample testimony to the early reputation of Homer 
and Hesiod as sophoi (despite Heraclitus’ own desire to repudiate their alleged sophia); 
cf. frr. 22 B 40, 42, 56, 57, 105, 106 Diels-Kranz. 
17 O’Sullivan 66–79 and see section <sc>ii<sc> below. 
18 West 440–41 regarded the recurrence of the lines in Alcidamas as the repetition of 
lines from a riddling “party game” that he would have found current. West could not see 
any sign that Aristophanes associated his lines with Homer and Hesiod, but this was 
astutely addressed by Richardson 2, who noted that the Peace passage highlights two 
themes closely paralleled in the Certamen: in each we find “rejection of war poetry, and 
the praise of feasting (Cert. 80ff.).” See also Schadewaldt 56 and 66–67, Compton-Engle 
327–29, and Graziosi 2001: 66. 
19 WD 654–57
3nya d' ßg n ßp' Íeyla da\fronow …Amfid„mantow | Xalk§ da [t'] e sep
rhsa: 
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tÂ d¢ propefradm
na pollÂ | Íeyl' 3yesan paõdew megal*torew: 3nya m
 fhmi
 | œmnÉ nik*santa f
rein tr§pod' ªtHenta. On the importance of this passage for 
the extant Certamen see Arrighetti 168, O’Sullivan 96–105, and Graziosi 2002: 168–74. 
20 See Nagy 66, Thalmann 152–53, and Rosen. 
21 For other structural parallels see Heldmann 59–63 and Cavalli, esp. 93–97. 
22 See esp. O’Sullivan 66–95. 
23 Lefkowitz 7–8. 
24 O’Sullivan 98. 
25 See Vogt 199, who says of the narrator: “Er zeigt eine besondere Vorliebe für Homer 
und hätte, wie es scheint, am liebsten ihn, den grossen Improvisator, siegen lassen, war 
aber andererseits durch eine auf den Versen Erga 654ff. beruhende Tradition an einen 
feststehenden Ausgang des Kampfes gebunden.” West 443 argued strongly, but 
unpersuasively, against this: “It is Hesiod who wins the prize, not Homer, and it is no 
good saying that he wins it only through the perversity of the adjudicator; … there is not 
a word to suggest that the decision was unjust.” It is true that the narrator himself never 
explicitly claims that Panedes’ verdict was unjust, but the narrator’s palpable sense of 
wonder at Homer’s dazzling performance, and the contrast he draws between the 
universal acclaim of the people and Panedes’ repudiation of their verdict leaves little 
doubt where his ultimate sympathies would lie. See now Graziosi’s discussion 2002: 
168–84, esp. 173–74. 
26 The Flinders-Petrie papyrus, printed in the fifth volume of the Homer OCT, p. 225.
Lines 3–4 have [ ]tro[pon | [ ]apantvn | [ ]tvn kritvn | [ p]anhdou. Given 
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the proximity of the word kritvn in line 3, the supplement in the next line to p]anhdou 
(i.e., giving the name of one of the krita§) is convincing. Contra: Heldmann 12–14 and 
85–90, who believed that the Panedes scene was a later addition contemporary with the 
extant text and that the original contest was not decided by a king. For criticisms of 
Heldmann’s thesis see Richardson 1984. 
27 See n. 18 above on the necessity for a Hesiodic victory. See also Graziosi 2002: 101–
10, who suggests another reason why Hesiod must win the contest, namely because he 
was regarded in antiquity as chronologically earlier than Homer. 
28 West 443, who, however, makes this point in arguing that the narrator finds nothing 
particularly reprehensible about Panedes’ decision (see discussion in preceding 
paragraph). It is true that neither Panedes’ decision in the Certamen nor Dionysus’ in 
Frogs can accurately be described as “contemptible” per se (each judge, after all, offers a 
rationale for his decision), but given the fact that in each contest tensions slowly mount 
between a “popular” and an “autocratic” verdict, the final decision is problematic, to say 
the least. See Graziosi 2002: 178–80, who argues that the Certamen reflects a tension 
between a popular, “democratic” Homer (possibly with democratic Athens particularly in 
mind), and a Hesiod who appeals more to a king, such as Panedes. Ford 277 finds the 
Certamen less concerned with “literary sophistication” than “kingship,” and contrasts this 
autocratic approach to that of democratic Athens (see 276–82). 
29 See discussion in Graziosi 2001: 71–72. 
30 The fact that Homer ultimately loses the contest in the Certamen has long been 
problematic for those who see Alcidamas as a champion of Homer; for discussion see 
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O’Sullivan 96–105, who stresses the pervasively negative treatment of Hesiod in the 
work, and the concomitant positive—and extensive—treatment of Homer. See also n. 27 
above. 
31 See, e.g., Frogs 971–
77: toiaÀta m
nto»g  froneõn | to+toisin e shghs„mhn, | logismn ßnyeãw t
™ t
xn  | kaã sk
cin, ¿st' edh noeõn | Îpanta kaã dieid
nai |
t„ t' Ílla kaã tÂw o k§aw | o keõn Ímeinon µ pr toÀ …
32 For discussion see del Corno 241–47, Dover 19 and ad loc. p. 369, and Sommerstein 
1996: 283 ad loc. I incline towards taking the •domai as referring to Euripides, indicating 
that Dionysus’ inexplicable craving for Euripides still holds strong, even if Aeschylus is 
now appealing for other reasons; but there is no denying the ambiguity of the passage. 
33 Here I follow those who attribute to Euripides lines 1442–50 (pace Dover), where he 
advises that the Athenians no longer trust the present leaders but rather reinstate those 
currently out of favor. See Sommerstein 1996: 289 ad loc. For discussion of the textual 
problems of 1435–66 see Sommerstein 1996: 286–92 with Dover 373–78. 
34 It is a striking coincidence indeed that the decisive contest between poets in both the 
Certamen and Frogs constitutes in each case the fifth round of competition. Whether 
there is more than coincidence at work here is, of course, impossible to say for sure. 
35 The advice in 1443, namely, to trust a different set of leaders than those they currently 
trust (… òtan tÂ nÀn Ípista p§sy' dgHmeya) is humorously enigmatic in its 
phraseology, but essentially in line with the advice of the parabasis (674–737); see 
Sommerstein 1996: 289 ad loc. That the Athenians approved of the political “advice” of 
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the parabasis is clear from the evidence pointing to second performance of Frogs, 
probably the following year; see Sommerstein 1996: 21. Two testimonia mention the re-
performance of the play, and it is curious that when each mentions the Athenians’ praise 
of Aristophanes for his parabasis the wording resembles the public acclaim of Homer in 
the Certamen. Hypothesis Ic (Dover) to Frogs, citing Dicaearchus as source, says: 
oœtv d¢ ßyaum„syh t drÁma diÂ tÿn ßn a»tì par„basin ¿ste kaã Ènedid„xy
h ..., and the Aristophanes Vita (Aristophanes Test. 1.35 Kassel-Austin), which also 
mentions Athenian accolades for the parabasis, notes that Aristophanes was “praised” and 
“crowned” by the Athenians: … ßpn
yh kaã ßstefanHyh; cf. Certamen 205
yaum„santew d¢ kaã ßn to+tÉ tn ‹Omhron o  ‹Ellhnew ßp noun. But in this 
story, of course, it is Hesiod who gets the victory crown: 
! d¢ basile¡w tn —Hs§odon ßstef„nvsen. If the public “universally” approves 
what Aristophanes proposed in his parabasis, and if Euripides is shown to espouse the 
same views at the end of the play, then it is legitimate to see Euripides here as taking a 
popular position. 
36 In later antiquity, Panedes became a proverbial “type,” representative of the powerful 
person who makes a foolish decision; see O’Sullivan 96. 
37 See Stevens for one of the first discussions of the problems of evaluating the 
biographical evidence about Euripides. He characterized the traditional view of Euripides 
“… spending the last twenty-five years of his life in Athens … in an atmosphere of 
increasing isolation, unpopularity, and persecution” as greatly exaggerated, and 
understood better than most scholars at that time that comic ridicule—our main source 
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for attitudes about Athenian attitudes towards Euripides—need hardly have implied 
disapprobation. See esp. 92–93. 
38 See Lefkowitz 88–104. She notes that ignominious stories were also attached to 
Sophocles and Aeschylus, and that they seemed to be part of the pattern of “heroic” 
biographies of literary figures. See also Stevens 90. 
39 See Lefkowitz 103; Stevens 92 finds it significant that Euripides seems never to have 
been denied a chorus: “… if we think of his career as one in which he could practically 
count upon production, in which on three occasions at least and probably many more he 
won the second prize, and on four occasions won the first prize, should we regard this as 
a failure?” On the procedures for judging dramatic competitions, see Csapo and Slater 
157-60 and Wilson 101-102. 
40 See Stevens 92: “… [I]f anything emerges clearly from the Frogs … it is, I believe, the 
background assumption of the whole play that among contemporary dramatists Sophocles 
and Euripides were undoubtedly the best.” 
41 See Ford 282, who notes that this scene reflects a “populist passion” behind the 
contest, and perhaps a mild satire of the pitfalls of democratic judging of art. 
42 The fact that Euripides’ fans in the underworld are portrayed as criminals need not be 
taken as a serious comment on Euripides’ fan-base in the real world. Given Euripides’ 
evident popularity at Athens, Aristophanes here essentially characterizes most Athenians 
as criminals. But this kind of banter is no different from other examples in Aristophanes 
of benign mockery of the audience; cf., e.g., the end of the agôn in Clouds (1094–97) 
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where Worse Logos convinces Better Logos that the majority of the audience were 
e»ruprHktoi.
43 See Graziosi 2002: 178–80 and n. 27 above. 
44 No doubt Aristophanes would have been similarly skeptical about the possiblity of 
evaluating poetry adequately even using “poetic” criteria. Certainly the explicitly literary 
agôn of Frogs does not make Dionysus’ task of deciding between the two poets much 
easier or more informed in the end. 
45 See, for example, Hubbard 216: “Like Aeschylus [Euripides] professes to aim at the 
betterment of citizens through his drama (vv. 1009–10); yet he seems rather unconcerned 
with the effects of his plays on the audience and the future behavior of its members.” 
46 Plato was not unaware of the diversity and power of poetic form, but his analysis and 
evaluation of formal elements were usually put in terms of how such components 
enhanced the poem’s moral value. See, for example, the discussion of the different forms 
of narrative style in Rep. 3.392d–403c, where Socrates argues that the various kinds of 
mimesis, as well as rhythm and musical mode, have different moral characters. At 403c, 
he sums up their discussion by saying simply that the end of the poetico-musical arts 
should always be the desire for the good 
( deõ d
 pou teleutÁn tÂ mousikÂ e w tÂ toÀ kaloÀ ßrvtik„). In general see 
Halliwell 72–97. 
47 See Asmis. For Philodemus, as Asmis summarizes (p. 165), “what makes a 
poem good is appropriate thoughts expressed in appropriate diction.” Moral 
content seems part of the critical mix for Philodemus (in opposition to some of his 
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“opponents”), but as an Epicurean, he would have privileged even more the 
amount of pleasure a poem could bring, though pleasure seen as a function of a 
synthesis of meaning, thought and expression. See Asmis 1995a, with Sider, and 
Porter. 
48 I replace Sbordone’s reading of this phrase (3jv to+tvn) with Degani’s, 
printed in his testimonia to Hipponax; cf. Degani  18, ad Testim. 48.
49 Neither the Aristophanic Dionysus nor the Certamen’s Panedes, of course, ever 
explicitly states that the poet who loses in their respective contests is a “bad” poet, 
and in the case of Dionysus, he obviously is struggling to make a decision 
between two poets whom he likes and respects for different reasons. Each judge, 
however, in the end assesses the worth of the contestants relative to each other 
and establishes which one should be considered “better” by using the sole 
criterion of social benefit. Philodemus evidently would object not so much to the 
fact that the didactic import of a poet entered into the evaluative process at all, but 
that it would  be the deciding factor in making a decision about an entire poet’s 
work. 
50 See Cols. xxxii 9-17, as printed in Asmis 154. 
51 In the context of current Athenian needs, of course, Dionysus’ criterion (the 
perceived notion that Aeschylus had better advice to offer) was certainly not 
“arbitrary,” but when regarded strictly as a mechanism for evaluating the worth of 
a poet and his work, it certainly was, especially in view of the many other “tests” 
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that were administered throughout the Frogs agon, and which were subsequently 
ignored in favor of a single “non-poetic” criterion. 
52 See, e.g. the interview with Heracles, 53-105, in which Dionysus describes his 
passion for Euripides in entirely personal terms. It is revealing also that at line 97, 
Dionysus emphasizes that one of the essential qualities that made Euripides so 
great was his ability to “belt out a ‘real’ expression” 
(òstiw = ma gennaõon l„koi). Dionysus’ focus on the poetic expression (as 
opposed to the poem’s thought) anticipates the Hellenistic concept of “euphony,” 
associated with (among others) Crates of Mallos and criticized by Philodemus. 
See Sbordone and Asmis 152. 
53 See, in general, Sommerstein 1992: 27–30, who would even go so far as to say that an 
interest in didaxis and paraenesis may be limited among poets of Old Comedy to 
Aristophanes. Heiden proposes an ironic reading of the play’s ending, with which I am in 
basic sympathy, although I would not go so far as to imagine, as Heiden implies, that 
Aristophanes actually disapproved of both Aeschylus and Euripides: “… Aristophanes 
does not endorse the character Aeschylus, as most intepreters have assumed, nor could he 
have endorsed the character Euripides, for each of them gives voice to an idea of theater 
and its civic function that is deeply opposed to the Old Comedy of Aristophanes.” 
54 This study had its origin as a paper delivered at a symposium honoring Professor W. 
Geoffrey Arnott at the University of Leeds in November 2000. It is a great pleasure to 
dedicate this expanded version to him, a scholar who has inspired komoidistai in so many 
ways for half a century. I owe sincere thanks to the anonymous referees for their 
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trenchant reading of this article, as well as to many friends and colleagues for helpful 
remarks and suggestions on earlier versions, especially Barbara Graziosi, Richard Janko, 
André Lardinois, James I. Porter, and Alan Sommerstein. 
